ARTICLE 19 Brazil would like to thank the following organizations and people for the support in the production of this report:

Open Society Foundations; DUTCH Fund; Ford Foundation; Anderson França
DISCLAIMER

This is not an exhaustive report on the status of individual cases. New information may emerge as cases develop, further reports are released, and official investigations progress.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
2018 was internationally recognized as being a violent year for journalists, with a rise in murders, arrests and retaliations for their work throughout the world. In Brazil, things were no different. This is the seventh year that Article 19 Brazil is publishing its report on violations to freedom of expression, and once again the number of cases of serious crimes against communicators reached 35, just as it did in 2012 and 2015.

Within a global state of alert regarding violence against communicators and discrediting of the press, the recording and publicizing of these cases has become especially important. It is impossible to understand the exercising of communication and freedom of expression without recognizing the context of violence that runs through this activity, which is especially true in a country like Brazil where this type of work is categorized as high risk.

Furthermore, the vulnerability of Brazil’s communicators operating in small towns, far from large metropolitan regions, is generally ignored or disregarded. The repercussions of cases of violence perpetrated against these groups rarely make it into national news, remaining restricted to local contexts. A communicator often relies on their personal network of partners to help bring the case to public attention. By and large, this is the case for most communicators working in Brazil: with the majority working informally and independently. In many towns, the local media is made up solely of these people.

The crimes analyzed in Article 19’s annual reports are always those that constitute direct attacks on life: homicides, attempted murders, death threats, kidnappings and torture. The cases discussed here are those in which the victims suffered these attacks due to exercising communication. There are situations where the existence of this relationship cannot be categorically confirmed, but if there is a reasonable possibility according to the sources consulted in the investigation process, the victim is included in this report.

Initially we will present an overview of these crimes, and follow with a list of the victims of each type of violence. Afterwards, we will provide a brief analysis of the crimes considering the political-electoral context that provides the central backdrop for many of the cases. Finally, an interview with citizen journalist and writer Anderson França shares his story as a communicator being threatened and reflects on the condition of communicators in the urban peripheries of our large cities.

[1] Article 19 considers as serious violations cases of murder, attempted murder, death threat and kidnapping.

[2] In the category of communicators, are included journalists, broadcasters, bloggers, citizen and community journalists and media outlet owners.
2018 has reconfirmed the situation of violence against communicators in Brazil. If the number of serious crimes in 2017 was slightly lower than average, 2018 saw a return to higher levels of violence, with 35 cases of serious crimes, repeating the figure recorded in 2012 and 2015, the years when the highest numbers of cases were recorded.

Despite the high number of death threats having had a significant impact on this increase, the occurrence of four homicides (double the number recorded in the previous year) is a warning sign. It is worth highlighting that the numbers may be even higher than we are presenting, since there are a number of cases that have not been included in this report as during our investigation we were unable to establish a clear relationship between the crime and the exercising of communication. In addition to this, it should be recognized that cases are often under-reported, especially in the case of certain crimes and profiles, meaning that a number of cases may not have come to our attention.

The general tendencies remain the same as those noted in previous years: agents of the State continue to be the principal criminals, especially politicians; communicators in small towns remain the most targeted; the Northeast and Southwest continue to be the most violent regions; and the violence against broadcasters continues to rise, with 2018 seeing the highest number of crimes ever recorded by Article 19 against this category, with a total of 12 cases.

If the figures suggest a persistence of violence that has already been recognized, this does not mean that it remains unaltered. These figures should be seen in the light of a social context in which there is a rise in the number of attacks on communicators and a discrediting of the press in various parts of the world, as well as a consolidation and expansion of the online environment as a violent space, especially in the field of social media. In Brazil, this was particularly notable during two events that took place over the course of the year: the truck drivers’ strike that occurred at the end of May; and the electoral period that ran throughout the year until the second round of voting was held in October.

On these occasions, a great many crimes against communicators were recorded across the country. The majority of crimes do not concern attempts on life, as the cases covered in this report do, but rather they are recurring episodes of intimidation, restraint, physical and verbal aggression, restraint from performing one’s job, or the breaking or causing of damage to equipment. One element that deserves particular attention is the fact that one specific trait identified in the more serious crimes is also found in many of these cases: the rise of members of the general public as aggressors.

Considering this situation, it is worth mentioning an important victory obtained by civil society: the inclusion of social communicators in the Program for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (PPDDH) in the form of the Human Rights Ministry’s Ordinance nr. 300, published in September 2018.

Through this Program, communicators who are threatened or at risk because of their work can request support for the establishment of directives designed to protect their lives and physical wellbeing. The ordinance establishes a broad definition of a social communicator, including those who regularly work with activities relating to social communication (be it as a professional or on a more personal level, without receiving remuneration for the activity) with the purpose of disseminating information designed to benefit human rights. The expansion of the definition is important within the Brazilian context, in which many individuals provide communication on an informal basis, without specific training in the area and without any professional certification. Many communicators who are the target of serious crimes fit precisely into this profile.
Even though the inclusion of certain profiles of communicators in the PPDDH is an important step forward in the Brazilian State’s recognition of the situation of violence and the need these profiles have for protection, there are a number of concerns over this process that still need to be addressed by the Brazilian State.

Firstly, it is important to stress that a specific profile has been established of the type of communicator who will be provided with support: the type who publishes information in benefit of human rights. Even though this approach is in line with the scope of the Program, it is important to stress that many communicators in situations of risk or who are victims of serious crimes may not fit this profile or even self-identify with it. In this case, what is the effective response of the Brazilian State in terms of protecting these individuals?

It is also concerning that the ordinance that includes communicators as well as environmental defenders does not provide any responses to other complaints concerning improvements in the program, with the most important of these being the formal return of civil society organizations to the Advisory Board responsible for the policy. Since April 2016, Decree nr. 8,724 has established that the Board of the PPDDH should be composed solely of two representatives of the then Ministry of Women, Racial Equality, Youth and Human Rights, and one representative of the Ministry of Justice.

The distancing of civil society from a policy supposedly designed to protect those working in defense of human rights is extremely worrying in terms of its effectiveness, since it is the social organizations that traditionally monitor and expose human rights violations and who have a great deal of experience with which to contribute to the policy in this area. Furthermore, the inclusion of new profiles in the program requires an adaptation of the policy to understand the dimensions of the violence against these groups, and this process would be able to contribute that much more if there was a truly effective space for participation by society.

In addition, despite the declaration made by the government of former President Michel Temer that there would be an increase in the Program’s annual budget for 2018 and 2019, there has still been no inclusion of any updated or better protection methodologies developed for the protection of those it is supposed to support but who have no state representation in the majority of the regions of the country.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kidnappings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SERIOUS VIOLATIONS BY YEAR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNDERSTANDING THE SERIOUS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED IN 2018

WHO HAS SUFFERED THE CRIMES?

Article 19 defines a communicator as a person who exercises communication as a regular activity, be it remunerated or not, regardless of any academic or professional certification. We interpret the exercising of communication from the perspective of the exercising of the human right to the freedom of expression that cannot be limited by the certification of professional categories. As such, we consider communicators to be professional journalists and reporters, broadcasters, photographic and cinematographic reporters, bloggers, popular and community communicators, media-activists, cartoonists, etc.

Journalists were the individuals most affected by serious crimes in 2018, accounting for 17 cases (49%), meaning almost half the total recorded cases, and the majority of the death threats, with 14 cases.

The high number of occurrences against broadcasters is also extremely serious. With 12 recorded cases (34% of the total), this is the highest number of crimes against this category recorded by Article 19 since we started publishing our report in 2012. Of the four murders that took place in 2018, two cases involved broadcasters – Jefferson Pureza, in Edealina (GO) and Jairo Sousa, in Bragança (PA).

Of the 35 communicators, 27 confirmed that they had suffered some form of previous crime, such as verbal aggression, intimidation or legal action, among others. Of these, 10 stated that they have received death threats as a result of their activities.

We also saw five cases of attacks on the newsrooms or head offices of media vehicles in 2018. It is also worth noting that in some of these attacks the location of the operations performed by the media vehicles (such as blogs, local news portals and social media pages) is the communicator’s home. Gunshots aimed at the front of the buildings occurred in four cases, while in the other case the death threat found in a note was accompanied by a gunshot to the journalist’s home.

Online violations have been significant in 2018. Eleven cases were recorded in which an online tool served as the medium for making the death threat, including messaging apps, social media or e-mails. Journalists were the main victims of this form of attack, with eight cases. One owner of a communication vehicle also suffered an attack of
this type, which came in the form of a threatening message to his private number that he shared with his whole staff. In these cases, it is a recurring theme that the communicator is attacked publicly online by a wide range of users of social media and receives private threatening messages from one or more aggressors.

The monitoring of this type of death threat has proven to be a challenge. The frequency of online attacks and the number of aggressors is very difficult to gauge in terms of calculation and identification, since not all the communicators who suffer this type of attack decide to make it public. The chances of these cases being under-reported is therefore extremely high. In this report we have recorded cases that we use in our investigation processes based upon accusations made by the communicators themselves, and usually using their own social media.

For Article 19, a basic criterion for the recognition of the crimes is the perception the victims themselves have of the crime that has been suffered, meaning that the cases included here are those in which the communicators report having felt that their lives were effectively at risk within the context of the threat.
WHERE DO THE CRIMES TAKE PLACE??

With 13 cases (37%), the Northeast remains the region with the highest number of these types of crimes in Brazil. This is followed by the Southeast, with eight cases (23%), where the highest number of media outlets in the country are located. But the rise in the number of media outlets in the country are located. But the rise in the number of occurrences in the North should also be emphasized. With seven cases (20%), including two murders, the region has witnessed its most violent year since Article 19 started publishing this report.

São Paulo returns to being the state with the most reported cases, with five victims, repeating the numbers recorded in 2016 and 2017. Next come Bahia and Paraíba, each with four cases.

Once again, small towns (those with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants) experienced the highest number of violations, with 19 cases (54%). Among these, there was one owner of a communication vehicle, two bloggers, eight journalists and eight broadcasters. It is also in these towns where the most violent crimes take place. Of the four murders registered, three were committed in small towns, and it was in this type of town that the four attempted murders also took place. Medium-sized cities (those with between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants), witnessed eight cases (23%).

There was, however, a rise in the crimes that occurred in large cities (those with more than 500,000 inhabitants), which can be explained by the rise of online threats. If in 2017 we registered just two serious violations in large cities, there were eight cases in 2018, all of which were the same type: death threats made via the Internet.
WHO COMMITTED THE CRIMES?

_In Brazil_, it is the agents of the State who commit the majority of the crimes against communicators. This has been recognized over the seven years that this report has been published, with politicians being the most prolific criminals, generally acting as the ones suspected of ordering the crimes. In 2018, State officials were responsible for 18 violations (51%), of which 15 had politicians behind them.

The principal reason continues to be the accusations reported by communicators, a factor that can be noted in 26 of the cases investigated (74%). In seven cases (20%), the attacks took place following criticisms or opinions expressed by the communicator. In another two cases (6%), meanwhile, it was investigation processes that motivated the violations.

However, the high number of cases in which the offenders do not fit into any specific profile is of interest. Here, once again, the online violations become evident, since the 10 cases in which the alleged author or mastermind behind the crime does not fit into a specific profile concern this type of situation. Of striking interest is the concerned observation made by one of the victims: that the number of members of the general public as aggressors is on the rise. Some of these cases have a specific individual who is responsible for the threat, while in others there are a number of aggressors.

Another characteristic of the online attacks is the fact that they target the reputation and personal honor of the communicator. Among all the different types of attacks listed here, we have noticed offenses and attacks against the individual, not only the content of their work. This high level of personalization of the aggression is of great concern, especially when a division between the personal and professional lives of the communicators in social media very often does not exist.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRESS OF THE CASES</th>
<th>NO OF CASES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The victim has not reported to the authorities</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities have not filed a report</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police inquiry under way</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The investigation has not moved forward</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police inquiry concluded, but a criminal case has not been opened</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The criminal trial has led to a conviction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No information found on the case</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
chapter 2

general overview

1 case

SPECIFIC PROFILE

3 cases

MURDER   ATTEMPTED MURDER

PUBLIC OFFICIALS

15 cases

BUSINESS PERSONS

17 cases

ALLEGED PERPETRATORS OF THE CRIME
**MURDERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim</th>
<th>Profile</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Town/State</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ueliton Brizon</strong></td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>01/16/2018</td>
<td>Cacoal/RO</td>
<td>Accusations directed at a local politician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jefferson Pureza</strong></td>
<td>Broadcaster</td>
<td>01/17/2018</td>
<td>Edealina/GO</td>
<td>Accusations directed at the local government authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jairo Sousa</strong></td>
<td>Broadcaster</td>
<td>06/21/2018</td>
<td>Bragança/PA</td>
<td>Accusations directed at the local government authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marlon Araújo</strong></td>
<td>Blogger</td>
<td>08/16/2018</td>
<td>Riachão do Jacuípe/BA</td>
<td>Accusations against location politicians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Politicians are suspected of having ordered three murders committed in 2018. In all of them, the procedure was similar: contracting third party gunmen to commit the crimes.

The journalist Ueliton Brizon was riding a motorcycle with his wife riding pillion when they were approached by another motorcycle. The aggressor shot at the communicator a number of times. He did not die immediately, but was pronounced dead at the hospital. The owner of a news portal covering local issues, Ueliton also made accusations against powerful figures in the town. Although the investigation remains ongoing, and there are suspects of those responsible for carrying out and ordering the crime, more than a year after the event, no arrests have yet been made.

Known for his investigative approach and for his accusations, Jefferson Pureza, a broadcaster from Edealina, had already been the target of a number of different violations. He had received death threats for a year and a half, and in 2017, the radio station where he worked suffered a fire under suspicious circumstances. In January 2018, two men on a motorcycle approached him in the garage of the house of his partner and shot him dead. Six individuals accused of involvement in the crime are under arrest, including the assassin and the individual who ordered the crime.

Jairo Sousa is another broadcaster who had been receiving threats and messages before he was murdered in the doorway of the radio station where he worked as he arrived was arriving. With an extensive and wide-ranging career in the media of Pará state, Jairo was also well-known for making accusations against local politicians. A group of gunmen accused of being involved in performing the crime were arrested, as was a member of the local town council who was accused of ordering the crime.

The fourth communicator murdered in 2018, Marlon Araújo, used social networks as a platform for his work. Using videos published on Facebook, he spoke out about the problems involving the public administration and politicians working in different towns in his region. He was gunned down in his own home in circumstances that still remain unclear. The inquiry into the death of Marlon remains ongoing, but little progress has been made.
ATTEMPTED MURDERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim</th>
<th>Profile</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Town/State</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>José Pereira</td>
<td>Jornalist</td>
<td>02/12/2018</td>
<td>Sidrolândia/MS</td>
<td>Accusations made concerning irregularities in local trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Lourenço Dias</td>
<td>Jornalist</td>
<td>03/11/2018</td>
<td>Guarátinga/BA</td>
<td>Accusations of local criminal activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Alves</td>
<td>Broadcaster</td>
<td>04/20/2018</td>
<td>Jaguarauna/CE</td>
<td>Accusations of crimes by the public authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandoval Braga</td>
<td>Broadcaster</td>
<td>09/21/2018</td>
<td>Jaru/RO</td>
<td>Accusations against the local government authority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Political Accusations** can be seen as factors in the attempts made on the lives of broadcasters in 2018. Sandoval Braga and his colleagues at the ‘Rádio União’ radio station were surprised by the arrival of two hooded individuals in what at first sight seemed to be a hold-up. One of the men moved towards Sandoval, ordered him to sit on the ground and then shot him in the leg, telling him to be quiet. The União radio station is well known in Jaguarauna for its critical reports and comments concerning the local government.

While driving along the highway, Hamilton Alves was shot six times, with two bullets hitting him in the mouth. Having been injured, the communicator drove his car off the highway and was assisted by a plain-clothes police officer who happened to be passing. Thanks to the fast first-aid he received and the fact that he was taken straight to hospital, the broadcaster can now recover in safety. Hamilton had been making accusations of corruption connected to the town council of the city of Governador Jorge Teixeira. After the attack, “Operation Opening-up the Game” undertaken by the Rondônia Civil Police made a series of arrests in Governador Jorge Teixeira. Hamilton, however, still feels unsafe. According to the report, the arrests have targeted local politicians who could have been involved as masterminds behind the crime; the gunmen, however, remain at large.

The other two cases are notable for a possible mistake in identifying the individual responsible for the accusations that motivated the attacks. In one of them, José Pereira was frightened when he heard a series of shots fired in front of his house. Going out into the road, he saw that almost 30 shots had been fired at his house, out of which the ‘Sidrolândia News’ operates. The circumstances, however, suggest that the attack was a mistake. It is suspected that the attacker was looking for another outlet that had published articles concerning illegal activities committed on his business premises. In another case, Paulo Lourenço Dias’ attacker took him for the man who had made accusations against a friend of his concerning cases of sexual violence in his town. Although he was aware of the case, Paulo had never mentioned it in his publications.
## DEATH THREATS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim</th>
<th>Profile</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Town/State</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mariana Avanzzi</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>01/10/2018</td>
<td>Artur Nogueira/SP</td>
<td>Accusations directed at the local government authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luana Carvalho</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>02/05/2018</td>
<td>Andradina/SP</td>
<td>Accusations directed at a local politician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Éder da Silva Peixeira</td>
<td>Journalista</td>
<td>02/13/2018</td>
<td>Sonora/MS</td>
<td>Accusations of local crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcelo Ribeiro</td>
<td>Broadcaster</td>
<td>02/28/2018</td>
<td>Boa Vista/RR</td>
<td>Accusations of corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenal Silva</td>
<td>Broadcaster</td>
<td>03/2018</td>
<td>Delmizo Gouveia/AL</td>
<td>Accusations directed at a local politician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maíra Arevedo (Tia Má)</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>03/01/2018</td>
<td>Salvador/BA</td>
<td>Opinions and criticisms of issues relating to racism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abxantes Júnior</td>
<td>Broadcaster</td>
<td>13/03/2018</td>
<td>Patos/PB</td>
<td>Accusations directed at local politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jozivan Antezo</td>
<td>Broadcaster</td>
<td>03/13/2018</td>
<td>Patos/PB</td>
<td>Accusations directed at local politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilberto Fernandes</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>03/26/2018</td>
<td>Panañguá/PR</td>
<td>Accusations directed at the local government authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tião Maia</td>
<td>jornalista</td>
<td>06/17/2018</td>
<td>Rio Branco/AC</td>
<td>Accusations directed at local politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Salles</td>
<td>Broadcaster</td>
<td>07/08/2018</td>
<td>São Luiz Gonzaga/MA</td>
<td>Accusations directed at the local government authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>VipSocial</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>07/12/2018</td>
<td>Tijucas/SC</td>
<td>Accusations directed at organized crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fillis Niorges</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>07/14/2018</td>
<td>Barra/BA</td>
<td>Accusations directed at the local government authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilherme Dearo</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>07/30/2018</td>
<td>São Paulo/SP</td>
<td>Criticism/opinions on racism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The 26 death threats investigated in 2018 represent the highest incidence of this type of violation ever registered by Article 19. As previously mentioned, the increase is mostly due to online threats, that account for 11 cases, all of which were committed by a non-specific profile of perpetrator, considering the profiles categorized in Article 19’s methodology.

Further to the effective risk of a threat taking concrete form, the psychological problems and the imposition of fear are clear effects. On top of this, the content of the threat needs to be taken into consideration. In relation to this aspect, the way threats suffered by female communicators happen needs to be recognized as a specific issue. Women communicators report that in the threats and insults received, the fact that they are women, or even mothers, serves as an element in the attacks. Messages sent by the aggressors include threats of sexual violence, attacks on their children and family and language of a misogynist nature.

A death threat is sometimes a one-off message, a specific instance.
that serves as an intense form of intimidation. In other situations, the threat is made within the context of other violations that are already being made, and is made as a means of scaling up the aggression in an attempt to silence a communicator. The lack of immediate investigations or the delegitimization of the accusation only serves to perpetuate the sense of risk and insecurity felt by the communicator.

This situation has been noted in a number of cases that have been investigated. In one of the cases of attacks on media outlets, for example, the victim saw no initiatives taken towards finding those suspected of shooting at the head offices of his organization. Feeling highly at risk, he decided to leave journalism. This self-censorship is a common phenomenon among victims of serious violations.

Due to the lack of action from the State, there are communicators who implement their own defense strategies. In one of the cases investigated, a communicator had reached an agreement with their aggressor at a preliminary hearing for the latter to use the different networks to publicly retract the aggressive statements and threats they had made. The retraction was not made as had been hoped, since the aggressor delivered the agreed statement on a social network with very little visibility. The communicator decided to publish the entire case on a network with much greater reach, and this included using a video of the situation of aggression and threat along with a copy of the police report. The repercussion had the desired effect, increasing the visibility and public support for the case, which led to the removal of the aggressor from their public office.

This case also demonstrates that the victims often have suspicions or knowledge about the identity of their attackers. This should be central to investigating these crimes.

Other attempts at silencing communicators, although initially successful, may have the support from the community wishing to see the media outlet remain in operation, which also helps to fight the violations, even without a concrete response from the State. This was the case involving the community radio station ‘Rádio Educadora’, in Gurupá (PA), which was the target of an arson attack that completely destroyed its equipment. Another similar but unsuccessful attack had been attempted a few months earlier. In October the aggressors succeeded. The case had widespread repercussions, leading to a great uproar amongst the town’s community. But after a time, the radio station was back. With the support of a local association linked to the radio station managed to obtain a loan that could be used to purchase new equipment and reconstruct the building in order to get back on the air.
Kidnappings of communicators is not common among the serious crimes investigated by Article 19 in Brazil. No incidences had been registered since 2014 until 2018, which happened to be the first in a series of crimes committed that year against broadcaster Ilton Santos, presenter of the ‘É de Lascar’ show on the ‘Liberdade’ radio station in Morrinhos (CE).

On January 25, when leaving the station, Ilton was approached by an armed individual who forced him to get in his vehicle and took him to an unknown location. With a sharp turn of the steering wheel, the broadcaster turned the car towards a fence and managed to escape. A few weeks later, the communicator received a number of messages, on his cell phone, made in a threatening tone, from one of the town’s councilors. The political coverage and the opening up of his program for the public to air their opinions had been bothering the authorities of Morrinhos since 2017, when councilors from the municipality attempted to get an official request approved which would demand access to the recordings of the “É de Lascar” show. Denounced by organizations such as the Union of Broadcasters of the Interior of Ceará State and by the Association of Journalists of the Interior of the State, the application was shelved.
CHAPTER 3

ELECTIONS AND ONLINE VIOLENCE: A NEW SCENARIO OF VIOLENCE EMERGES
_The violent_ year for communicators sheds light on the danger and persecution experienced by these professionals. But it is not just brutal crimes that should call our attention: we also need to consider the spreading of violence in other forms, in terms of how it is practiced on a daily basis and by whom, as the impacts on communication and freedom of expression.

As previously discussed, the electoral process can be seen as a backdrop to the increase in crimes committed, even before the official campaign period start. It is enough to note that as early as January 2 2018, 10 months before the first round of the elections, the photo journalist Guilherme Santos, from the ‘Sul 21’ website, had a gun pointed to his head by a member of the state armed police after he had taken photos of the exterior of the building of the Federal Regional Court of the 4th Region, in Porto Alegre, where ex-President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was to be tried. Acts of violence against communicators persisted until after the celebrations of Jair Bolsonaro’s election to the presidency in October.

The political-electoral context was, therefore, a significant driver in increasing the risk and acts of violence against communicators, whether they were attacks on their lives or not.

Focused on federal and state positions, the elections can be added to the day-to-day local political contexts of the municipalities.

Politics as a backdrop is present in 26 (74%) of the 35 violations against life presented in this report. Work and expression of the communicators’ violated includes coverage of corruption cases, accusations against the public administration and even investigations into aspects of the electoral process. In the majority of these cases, politicians are the suspected masterminds behind the violations, but business people and public officials are also often alleged perpetrators. However, as mentioned earlier, the increase of online violence against communicators brought an emerging type of perpetrator that has started to recur on a regular basis: members of the public without any defined profile.

Even this report focus on the more serious violations against communicators, Article 19 monitors all kinds of violations. Taking this into consideration, more than half of the 184 acts documented by Article 19 in 2019 have some sort of relation to Brazil’s political and electoral context, including cases that involve more than one person, such as those involving attacks on teams of reporters or editing rooms.
CONSTRUCTING THE MOTIVATIONS FOR THE CRIMES

Even though the motivation for the attacks is different for each type of aggressor, there is one shared objective: silencing the communicators and slighting their work. And in relation to this point, there is one aspect that we would like to focus on: the crisis of credibility of the role of communicators. This is key to understanding motivation for the violence.

When observing the forms that the attacks take, it is common to see the aggressors verbalizing their belief that the outlets and communicators which have become the target of the aggression are not reliable, have no credibility, are motivated by spurious interests, and are not impartial. The questioning focuses on the communicator as a subject and, eventually, on the outlet that they represent, with the discourse being ignored.

In many different cases, this position is expressed in a manner that is offensive, intimidating, unsettling and threatening, turning the questioning of the credibility into a personal attack and an attempt to destroy reputations. Evidently this is not the place to assess the grounds for questioning of communicators’ credibility. While this is an important discussion and there are legitimate questions that need to be asked about the role of the media in the disinformation process, something which contradicts its most basic principles, this report focuses on analyzing attacks and crimes against communicators: acts of violence that cannot be justified with a basis in any sort of value judgment on the quality of the work of communicators.

In this sense, the role played by public figures and authorities can be fundamental both in terms of legitimizing and strengthening the role of the media, as well as in reducing the legitimacy communicators’ work, to the point of exposing them and leaving them more vulnerable to attacks. When those who hold these positions reaffirm a position that further weakens the legitimacy of communicators, it is freedom of expression that is put at risk, since declarations of this sort contribute to constructing motivation for violence. This way of questioning the work of the press cannot be justified by claiming that this is, itself, an exercise of freedom of expression since it forms part of a set of actions that are aimed at silencing others. This stance is even more worrying considering the fact that politicians are the category that most frequently falls under suspicion as the masterminds behind the crimes, which raises concerns about politicians’ attitudes towards communication professionals and how public authorities are part of the cycle driving these crimes: from the public destruction of legitimacy to the direct attacks on life.

In many cases, journalists suffer attacks precisely because of the work they do in the fight against disinformation, be it in relation to the checks they make or the investigations they perform into the contexts of production and dissemination of disinformation. There are also situations in which, even though they have not worked to fight or investigate disinformation, communicators have become targets of disinformation themselves.

The online environment is the main field for these attacks which take many different forms. It is worth noting that within this field the limit between the public and the private is difficult to establish, since communicators often make use of their personal profiles on social media platforms to spread the word about their journalistic work.
or even publish their opinions. It is precisely through these profiles that a large part of the violations are performed, in the form of mass offenses, hacking of accounts, threats of aggression, or even death.

Within a context such as this, the personalization of the exercising of communication becomes that much more emphasized as a risk factor, since the attacks do not set out to question only the information published, but also harm the outlet and the communicator. This can best be seen when the personal profiles of communicators who work for big media houses are attacked on social media. But the problem becomes more acute in small towns for local communicators, where the overlap between a communicator’s private life and their public one is even greater. It is often the case that the communicator’s name lends itself to the name of the blog or the page of a social media platform, or the name of the communicator appears in the name of a radio show, very often on the air for a period of time that has been rented by broadcasters who have no formal links with the broadcasting outlet.

Unfortunately, this dynamic noted in small towns has also now been observed in the new administration at the federal government. In the first one hundred days of the administration, which have been analyzed by Article 19 through to the writing of this report, a number of different cases have shown the President’s behavior to be systematically hostile towards the press. The cases range from difficulties in participating in press events and press conferences to more direct attacks or attempts to discredit journalism in official statements and publications on social media, above all on the President’s personal Twitter account and those published by his sons (who are also elected public officials). Very often, the attacks are intensified by their supporters who start or increase their circulation online without any disapproval from the President’s office.

The 10 most emblematic cases have been brought together in a infographic which reveals a context that restrains the exercising of the profession which could lead to the curtailing of Brazilians’ right to information.
CHAPTER 4

INTERVIEW: ANDERSON FRANÇA
“So you’re walking around the city, right?”

“Yes. We walk a lot, because taxis are expensive here. So we walk a long way here; like, 5km doing one thing or another,” says Anderson França as he walks around the streets of Lisbon, Portugal. While still establishing himself in this new town – where he doesn’t have a driving license, car or money enough for transport – these long walks are his primary means of getting around. It is on one of these walks that he gives this interview to Article 19.

Pushed into moving by the threats he had been receiving for some time, this writer, businessman and communicator decided to leave Brazil at the end of 2018. The self-exile movement caused by the contexts of violence is growing. In addition to Anderson, the activist Sabrina Bittencourt, the human rights activist and Congressman reelected to represent Rio de Janeiro Jean Willys, and the philosophy professor and women rights activist Márcia Tiburi, have also left the country.

The author of the book of stories ‘Rio em Shamas’ and founder of the education and entrepreneurship project for people living in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, ‘Universidade da Correria’, Anderson França was born in the northern zone of Rio de Janeiro. In his writings, he depicts the day-to-day life in the city, and its characters, with the freedom and dexterity of informal street language, drawing attention to the tiny and comic absurdities of everyday existence. An active voice on social media, the writer often also discusses issues concerning politics, racism, police activities and their impacts on the people on the periphery of our cities.
In this conversation with Article 19, Anderson reflects on what it means to be a favela communicator, the risks and challenges of the path he has chosen, as well as the threats and crimes he has suffered.

[A19]
Anderson, you have been involved in a wide range of activities; you are a social entrepreneur, writer and teacher and, in the midst of all this, you are also a communicator. In what sorts of spaces have you performed your work as a communicator?

[AF]
Well, corporate spaces that have paid me have been TV Globo, Conspiração Filmes, the Fábrica production company, and the Companhia das Letras. I think these have been my most important jobs. Smaller-scale jobs, but ones I have still been paid for, have included the Fundação Telefônica, Brasil Foundation and ImpactHub in Brazil. All these small jobs addressed the reality of the urban periphery, so they needed a communicator with connections in the periphery of cities to speak for them. Outside this, of the communication jobs that I have done in the community, the first was AfroReggae. One important thing between 2010 and now, is that social activists have started having more access to the Internet. The smartphone and its technology, the social media, that has also developed since 2010, and the credit policy that Lula created for people to be able to buy cell phones, all these were determining factors for someone from a favela to get access to the web. And I’m from this generation; this first generation of communicators from the periphery who have gotten into the web. When you’re from the periphery, you need a public to be able to communicate, so this is a really big thing, it’s a very significant form of capital to have this type of a network.

[A19]
Article 19: Thinking a little about this role of a favela communicator, what does it mean to perform this role and what risks do you see this work as involving?

[AF]
Looking back, I think that, for the last nine years, the favela communicator has found a formula to reach a very large public without needing a newspaper, without needing the traditional media, the remunerated media. A writer from the periphery may very often be read more than a ‘Globo’ columnist, a ‘Jornal do Brasil’ columnist, which means that some may even be hired to write for the newspapers. So this sort of “democracy” of the web is the most important thing about being a favela communicator: it’s about you managing to reach a lot of people who you wouldn’t have been able to reach before. And this is positive in a lot of senses, because people start to read you every day. The risk of this is that it’s not only those who agree with
you who are going to read you. Those who you criticize, the policemen, are going to read you. So if you criticize the police, the police are going to read you. If you criticize the drug dealers, the drug dealers are going to read you. If you criticize the politicians, the politicians are going to read you. So the risk is that those who read you are not only those who like you, but those who start to take notice of your position in society and also look to challenge you on things you say. And when you live in the poor periphery of the city, this challenge can invariably involve violence. The silencing of people in the periphery is very open and people are very vulnerable because of the lack of full civil rights in the poorer neighborhoods. Raul Santiago [a social activist and member of the communication collective called ‘Papo Reto’, made up of residents of the ‘Complexo do Alemão’ and ‘Penha’ favelas in Rio de Janeiro], is now a guy who is listened to by thousands of people, but no one can guarantee his safety, and he continues to remain in the same place. He still lives under the same effects of the violence that he exposes. So the risks are great. And they just get worse when you start involving the profiles of gender and race: if you’re a woman, if you’re gay, if you’re black. Within the periphery there is the issue of territory, gender, class and race.

[A19]
The conditions and security for the favela communicator are fragile.

[AF]
There are two different eras: when you were a communicator in the time of Lula, in the decade when the PT (Workers’ Party) administration was in power; and now in the decade in which the coup took control and the rise of Bolsonaro. There are two different urban peripheries, two different countries, actually. Latin America over this whole period, over the last 20 years I think, has been making a turn to the right, a turn that’s sometimes violent. And now the Brazil that we have is a Brazil where the urban periphery itself has started supporting Bolsonaro. So the feeling of banishment, the feeling that I don’t support what we have in the periphery is really big. The first exile that the favela communicator is suffering in Brazil today is in the favela itself. He’s no longer understood there, he’s despised, he’s rejected in the periphery, that has also been turned into a violent place for him from a narrative point of view. The church doesn’t want to know about him. The market, the corner store, the butcher’s, the school, don’t want to know about this guy. He’s a problem, he’s a communist. So he starts being exiled there within.
[A19]
In our work we’ve seen a lot of communicators who talk about being in a situation of risk, who publicize the fact that they’re receiving threats and are being stripped of their legitimacy. This touches on what you say about the insensitivity to violence. How can a means of absorbing these situations be created, in relation to what people like you, for example, are experiencing?

[AF]
I’ve never been through what I’m going through, so I don’t know exactly how to reply to this question. But I want to believe that there’s some way out so that some sort of awareness can be created amongst these people. And to think about a way out, I have to think about a dialog; and to think about a dialog, I have to think about conceding. And to think about conceding, I have to think about understanding the language and the time that these people are in, and it’s not mine. And that’s where my criticism lies: the academic world isn’t able to do this now. Because the academic world, when it looks at the evangelical church, it looks at it from the outside, and in a prejudiced way in relation to popular faith, assuming that Brazilian popular faith was established between the non-practiced Catholicism and the African-rooted religions. But you have a religious practice going on, for good or for bad, in the popular layers, and it’s the neo-Pentecostal church. And for you to be able to have a dialog with someone [with these beliefs], you need to be aware of the cosmo-vision that this guy has with the world, that is monotheistic and conservative. If you can’t don’t have this awareness first of this guy’s world, you won’t manage to find the awareness to understand your own world. That’s where the great challenge lies for a lot of people on the left these days and which Mano Brown called attention to.

[A19]
And along these lines of awareness, can’t the favela communicator play a role? Or has this role been silenced, is this role not being exercised as it could be?

[AF]
Well, the favela communicator, he plays this role internally, very often trying to explain the world to the favela. But this favela communicator he doesn’t... OK, pay attention now: the big favela communicators aren’t on the left, or they aren’t primarily on the left. They’re people who understand the local nuances, they understand the difficulties of someone else, someone who’s not him, those on the edge, and they don’t come on all heavy with talk of politics and ideology. They do something that’s softer, they create more of a dialog.

[A19]
Thinking a little about this position of the favela communicator, regardless of the political side she’s moving towards, you’re saying that he’s in a different position to listen. It’s not just what this person is saying to the others, she’s in a different listening position in relation to her public.

[AF]
Principally this position. Because the favela communicator, he works on two fronts: He listens inside and takes it outside, he listens outside and takes
it inside. So he ends up listening from both sides. And he kind of tries, using the resources he has, to filter or interpret what’s happening for both sides. The favela communicator is a great social mediator who is on one side and the other side all the time providing communication. There isn’t any content that is born only inside us, it’s born within a context. We think that because a guy hasn’t been to university, because a guy doesn’t have much of a body of work, he’s just looked at something and written about it, he hasn’t been able to analyze it intellectually. But he has. The guy from the periphery, the communicator, he’s able to analyze, he’s capable of elaborating on issues. I’m talking here with you now, and a large part of the words that I’m forming to speak with you were learned over the years, from other journalists, from other academics, from people I got these words from. And I use words in a certain context to unlock in you the feeling that I can speak the same language as you. But if we were in a favela right now, in a discussion group, you’d see that I would be speaking a very different language. Or in other words, the guy from the periphery, he’s able to articulate and develop his thinking, to even develop the vocabulary, the dialects, to be able to talk with each specific public. My original language, man, my language is something else, my language is from the favela. And we talk a lot of slang there. But we also learn to speak the language of the street and the language inside. All these humorous Facebook pages in this context, the ones who come up with this are geniuses. Bit by bit, they manage to create an ethnography of themselves using humor. That guy there, Whinderson [Brazilian comedian], that guy’s a genius. The other crazy guy there, Lucas Albert, the other there, that does that big thing on Instagram, one of the biggest in the world, in a hood in the Northeast. These guys are geniuses. You don’t get that here [in Europe] man.

[A19]
The threats that you received just prior to the FLIP literary festival, in 2017, had great repercussions. But they were just one incident amongst various other episodes you’ve experienced. Could you tell us a little about these episodes?

[AF]
In 2018 there was the threat from Marcelo, from the ‘Grupo do Marcelo’, that ran from 2017 to 2018. The same group continued sending threats by e-mail, and even with the inquiry open, that culminated in him going to prison, I received other messages saying that it didn’t matter that he was in prison, that they were going to find me. These messages even continued once I’d arrived in Portugal. I divided these messages into categories: from inbox messages, by e-mail. They were being made by telephone, I found out once. Invasion of my house; that was the most serious. And phone tapping as well, that’s happened.

[A19]
Threats aimed at your life and physical attacks?

[AF]
Yes, explicitly and including every word saying what they’d do. Explaining that they’d butcher me,
saying exactly... It was the same group that did it to Jean [Willis] and to Lola [Aronovich, a feminist blogger and university professor]. The same people.

[A19]

And is there a profile, a profile pattern for these aggressors?

[AF]

There’s a pattern to the language; one of the patterns is linguistic. They’re all very focused on explaining the type of practice involved in the torture and crime. And this concern eventually reveals that the practices are similar. The impression you get is that they all read the same things to say what they’re going to do. So it seems that there’s a single source of information that says: you should butcher [the victim], then set them on fire, put them in a garbage bag, etc. So you see that it’s the same group that’s talking, because they all make similar threats. Another pattern is that it seems to me that they’re white men, and they’re associated with technology, with video games, or with Internet forums where they spend a lot of time together. And the constant presence of these men together creates an environment of permissiveness and talk that is more homophobic, xenophobic and racist. I took part in one of these to see who it is who’s threatening me and I saw that they talk about games. They’re men who play video games, they’re men who are unemployed, they’re men who don’t want a job, have no permanent relationship, have problems with women, and spend many hours at home on the Internet, and their frustrations start giving way to hate. They hate themselves and they project their hate onto others.

[A19]

The violence and threats were a central motive for your leaving the country. But before leaving Brazil how did these threats interfere in your daily routine? What effects did this constant violence, these messages, these acts, have on your daily life?

[AF]

Well, it stretches from the first aspect of it, which is the psychology one, through to basically getting around and freedom. You deal with six million people a month (those who read my stuff that is) and you start trusting no one. So, for example, on my web page, if there’s just the slightest little offense, then I block that person, because I don’t know if this person is being themselves really, or if there’s something behind them. And this is a policy that I have adopted and I won’t change it. But this is a loss of freedom. Because before, I let everyone write, but now I don’t allow this anymore. And in relation to the northern zone of Rio de Janeiro, I wouldn’t go everywhere, frightened of certain times of day, afraid of certain places. And these people knew where I lived. One of these people took a photo of my mum at a street market, saying they’d kill her. So the restrictions on freedom were, in practice, really big. And when Bolsonaro was elected, it became obvious that we couldn’t remain where we were anymore. So the feeling ranges from fear to a much greater feeling of helplessness and insecurity, that is much greater.

[A19]

Thinking a little about your texts and your career, one thing that is quite striking, is that you’ve moved house a lot. And now you’ve moved again,
perhaps the most radical of these moves. How do you feel now about this situation of where you live, do you feel as though you have a home?

[AF]
No, I don't have one any more, no. That's finished. This feeling of a home is truly over. I was in London the past few days, working there, and when I came back here, I didn't come home, I came here. This isn't my home. When we leave, it's not exactly planned, we don't come here to study, we don't come to work, we didn't want to come. We had to come. And this feeling of home doesn't exist for me. When I look back, to Brazil, that isn't my home either. Because it's become a country that I don't recognize anymore. And it's not the country I fought for. This country that's there now, it's not the one I fought for.

[A19]
But now there are a lot of new things you're putting together, with projects that are moving out into different countries. You're leading an itinerant life; can we say that?

[AF]
Yes, that's exactly it. You start having a... You go through a really strange process of creating a public persona. Marina [Silva] helped me to understand the importance of talking. When Marina opens her mouth to speak with the press, she's being Marina. The construction of many years of narrative. So I'm going through this here. When I went to Cambridge University, I gave a speech to people including the British Prime Minister's professor. This guy was watching me. I went to Oxford, and there were really important people there. When you put yourself on a stage that's so big in terms of academic importance, and you're not an academic, you need to publicly construct yourself. So you don't have a home anymore, you have yourself, you have your own history, your narrative, the place where you live is your narrative.
The increase in violence against communicators in 2018 is of great concern. It shows that the some possible improvement suggested in recent years has not been consolidated. Brazil continues to be a country of high risk for this type of work in the fight for freedom of expression.

The four murders and four attempted murders show the most violent side of this worsening situation. These cases should not raise the already high rates of impunity relating to these crimes in Brazil. The wide-scale repercussions and fast police action in at least two of these murder cases are still the exception.

The violence against broadcasters, especially in small cities, never stops increasing in Brazil. A highly vulnerable character, the broadcaster is very often the voice for areas in Brazil with little or no other local media. Special attention should be paid to this profile and its vulnerabilities.

As we have attempted to highlight, the crisis of credibility of journalism can be read as a motivating element for the violence against journalists. Recognition of this also extends to recognizing the digital environment as a stage for many of these violent acts. This means becoming more aware and ensuring an extensive understanding of the forms and effects of the online violence. The possibility of an attack should not be taken as the sole criteria for assessing a threat. These crimes also aim to cause psychological harm and silence communicators through fear.

In the same way, the offense and the damage done to the credibility of journalists and the press as a whole, cannot be minimized, but rather understood as a symptom of a disconnection of part of society with the work of communicators. It is of serious concern that general readiness to attack communicators has increased and that public figures encourage this persecution.

In addition to the ascertainment and effective investigation of the crimes against communicators, the relationship of credibility between the press and the public needs to be rebuilt. A society that is incapable of recognizing its own violence will be unable to recognize the suffering of others.

Finally, considering that politicians are the main suspects of being masterminds behind the crimes against communicators for many years, this permanent connection of public officials to violations of human rights is extremely worrying. In 2018, in addition to this dynamic repeating itself, new dynamics emerging from the political sphere have seen increased discrediting and slandering of the press.

Article 19 asserts that States have an obligation to prevent, protect and prosecute attacks against journalists and human rights defenders. Public authorities also have the obligation to refrain from delegitimizing the work of communicators or spreading disinformation to raise doubts about journalistic coverage whenever it is displeasing.

Finally, it should be stressed that, be it in the form of a direct action or an omission, the naturalization of attacks and dismissive tone used in referring to the press, places communicators at risk in a country that is already recognized for its violence against these professionals - that reach their most extreme form in murder. Furthermore, the deterioration of the environment for the work of communicators has an impact on the access to information by the public, on the circulation of different information and opinions, and on the ability of the media to perform its role as a watchdog to the public authorities, a role that is essential to the protection of democratic institutions. The right to informations of society as a whole is thereby prejudiced.
CHAPTER 6

METHODOLOGY
Article 19 defines the violation of freedom of expression as being any action, be it performed by the State or not, that either directly or indirectly interferes with the free circulation of ideas, opinions or information. The State's failure to act in opposition to these acts is also considered to be a violation of the freedom of expression.

This report is focused on cases suffered by communication professionals as it understands that these types of profession perform important activities relating to human rights – that are not restricted to individual freedoms, but principally provide a collective dimension of the freedom of expression. Recognizing the importance of these activities for society and the need to keep it at the top of the public agenda for debate, Article 19 monitors and registers violations against the freedom of expression suffered by these professionals.

This report of serious violations to the freedom of expression of communicators refers to those cases in which this human right to freely express oneself has been seriously violated, with the intention of placing the victim's life at risk, by means of the following crimes:

- **MURDER;**
- **ATTEMPTED MURDER;**
- **DEATH THREATS;**
- **KIDNAPPING**

The information ascertained, detailed and analyzed in this report concern only the serious crimes. However, other, less serious violations are also monitored, providing information that also serves to provide support for the development of this report.

The checking and consolidation of the information performed by Article 19 undergoes three stages:

- **Monitoring:** mapping the cases of violations and collecting initial information on each occurrence based upon journalistic materials published by different profiles of communication vehicles, social organizations, networks of correspondents and by the victims themselves or witnesses to the events.

- **Full report:** detailing the information mapped out in the monitoring phase, by means of investigation of each case, using interviews with the victims and their families as well as those known to the victims, members of civil society organizations that work with these issues, and the authorities responsible for the cases.

- **Accompaniment:** documentation and legal analysis of certain cases for assessment of possible legal action or forwarding of the cases to partner organizations, along with the adoption of public stances drawing attention to the cases and demanding that the State take the proper steps.

In the monitoring phase, all the different types of violation related to the freedom of expression described in the protocol were collected together. The complete record includes only the most serious cases - murder, attempted murder, death threats, torture and kidnapping. The figures relating to these categories were systematized for the development of this report.

In view of the fact that the occurrences brought together in the monitoring phase are drawn from news sites and the sites of other civil society organizations by the internal team from Article 19's protection and security program, we recognize that the lack of 'in loco' contacts in the different regions of the country may negatively affect the full collection of all the cases that may have taken place over the course of the year.

As such, we recognize that, despite the efforts employed, there is still the possibility that there exist cases that have not come to our attention and that the number of violations to freedom of expression suffered by communicators may be even higher than the number considered for the development of this report.
Important: Article 19’s investigation is performed independently to official investigations – which we consider to be only one possible version of the facts. This is necessary since the public officials and police officers involved in the investigations may be parties involved in the violation in question. On the other hand, Article 19 has no intention of substituting or competing with the work of the official investigation. On the contrary, we demand an official resolution of the cases and that the guilty parties be tried and punished, in accordance with the laws of the country.

ASSESSMENT OF THE DATA

To analyze the researched data, it was first necessary to identify all the available evidence that could reinforce and help support the direct relationship between the facts, the work of communication and the opinions and/or information that could have been expressed by the victim or which she was planning to express.

Once these correlations had been established, a cross-referencing was performed of analysis categories considered to be central for the profiling of the crimes. Within these categories, three types can be highlighted: those that profile the victim, those that profile the crime, and those that profile the perpetrator of the crime.

For the profiling of the victim, research was performed into the victim’s activity (journalist or reporter; broadcaster, blogger), and the gender.

For the profiling of the crime, analysis was undertaken of the type of crime (murder, attempted murder, death threats or torture); where it occurred (region, state and size of the city); and any existence of previous crimes. In relation to the size of the cities, the classification established by the IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Statistics) was used: small cities (less than 100,000 inhabitants); medium-sized cities (from 100,000 to 500,000 inhabitants) and large cities (more than 500,000 inhabitants).

The profiling of the perpetrator of the crime was performed by means of an analysis of the profile of the possible mastermind and the probable motives. The profile of the author is the type of activity that they perform to which the possible mastermind is connected within the context of the crime, with the following possibilities: a police officer or politician, someone involved in organized crime, a businessperson or public official.

Furthermore, we sought to find possible motives, linked to the exercising of the victim’s right to freedom of expression, that may have led the perpetrator to commit the crime. These include: investigation or verification of information; declaration of accusations; and expression of criticism or opinions.

Once the crime had been profiled from these different angles, we sought to establish the status of each case in the justice system, be it in the phase of the police inquiry, investigation by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, or a criminal case under way before the courts.

It is important to clarify that the information on the status of the cases was not obtained solely from the authorities since, in some cases, these authorities refused to collaborate with the investigation being performed by Article 19. Sometimes they were also not available to be contacted, or the contact was insufficient to ascertain the desired information. In these cases, the data referring to the status of the investigations was provided by the victims themselves or by people related to them and who have been following the case.
chapter 6

methodology